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Abstract: In a provocative, yet scarcely discussed, argument at the 
end of Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa has attempted to determine 
what kind of evidence we possess in support of the belief that our 
cognitive capacities as human beings are reliable. According to 
Sosa, we can appeal to considerations of coherence to prove that 
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such capacities are reliable (i.e., it would be epistemically self-
defeating to think otherwise). However, Sosa also declares that 
such considerations are not “determinative, ultima facie” 
reasons−which is to say, they are to be regarded as defeasible. As 
we will try to point out, this overall strategy is ultimately 
incoherent. Furthermore, as we will argue, Sosa fails in attempting 
to provide us with an analogy between the case of doubting the 
reliability of the cognitive faculties of an individual and doubting 





The present work will attempt to evaluate Sosa’s 
“transcendental argument” concerning the reliability of 
human knowing faculties. We will proceed as follows: in 
section 2, we will analyze the way in which Sosa presents the 
alleged doubts that, in a naturalistic framework, would 
appear concerning our own reliability as knowing subjects. 
In section 3, we will introduce Sosa’s proposed solution for 
these doubts, which appeals to an analogy between the case 
of doubting the capacities of the human species and 
doubting one’s capacities as an individual. In section 4, we will 
tackle some specific aspects of the argument: the problem of 
why the skeptical attitude is supposed to be “incoherent”; 
what “faculties” the argument is considering; how the 
argument concerning the case of the species is supposed to 
be analogous to the case of the individual, and how the 
agent’s own perspective on her cognitive capacities relates to 
her actual cognitive situation. This last element will lead us, 
in section 5, to present the way in which Sosa weakens his 
“transcendental argument”: given that the argument, as it 
first appears, is “insensitive to the facts” concerning the 
subject’s actual situation, Sosa will hold that such argument 
does not provide us with “determinative, ultima facie” 
reasons. In section 6, we will introduce our first criticism to 
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Sosa’s position in this weakened form: as we will argue, the 
author cannot prove that the agent’s own reasons can 
somehow be combined with information only available from 
a third-person perspective. Furthermore, as we will argue in 
section 7, things get even worse for Sosa’s argument when we 
take seriously his Disablex argument as an analogy and consider 
its applicability to the capacities of the species as such: in this 
case, unlike the case of the capacities of the individual, we 
find that normal human capacities are simply the “standard 
meter” on the basis of which we determine what it is to be 
“reliable” capacities−and thus it is simply false that we need 
to commit to a certain contingent description of their origins 
to deem them as reliable. 
 
 
2. SOSA, NATURALISM AND DOUBTS CONCERNING 
THE RELIABILITY OF HUMAN KNOWING CAPACITIES 
 
In Knowing Full Well, where his “transcendental 
argument” appears, Sosa does not dwell on specific details 
concerning the different ways of understanding naturalism 
in philosophy; instead, the problem that will concern him is 
presented in a rather concise way: 
 
Can the naturalist view us coherently as animals 
with sensory receptors that enable perceptual 
and other knowledge of our surroundings? The 
brute, blind etiology of our faculties is said to pose 
the following problem: “From our own 
rational point of view, how can we know that 
we are reliably attuned to our surroundings 
through our sensory receptors? How then can 
we properly rely on the deliverances of our 
sensory mechanisms?” (Sosa, 2010, p. 152 
Italics are ours). 
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Naturalists must confront how accidental the 
success of our cognitive faculties appears to be, if we go 
by evolution and by the naturalist conception 
of our minds as our contentful brains (Sosa, 
2010, p. 153. Italics in the original). 
 
So, roughly, here we find Sosa presenting a description of 
the way our cognitive faculties relate to the world, such that 
their origin would be “brute” and “blind” and their success 
in depicting the world would be “accidental”. Before turning 
to Sosa’s own “transcendental” solution to the problems 
raised by this description, we need to take a closer look to 
the presuppositions implicit here. To begin with, it is not 
clear why natural selection should be deemed as “brute” and 
“blind”. .If we conceded to Sosa that natural selection is 
“blind” in some relevant aspect, then his starting point could 
be an argument that, from a premise such that “Our 
cognitive capacities have evolved in a ‘blind’ way (that is, in 
a way that does not warrant that those capacities will be 
sensitive to reality as it is)” arrives at the conclusion “It 
would be an accident (a question of sheer luck−and we do 
not know whether or not we have been lucky) that our 
cognitive faculties have nonetheless turned out to be 
sensitive to reality as it is”. But this would not be a minor 
concession; in fact, it would be a rather hasty starting point: 
the idea that our origins are “blind” and “brute” does not 
seem to suit the fact that it is the emergence of new biological 
traits which is random, but not their selection under the 
pressures of the environment (cf. Dawkins, 1996, Chapter 3 
for a succinct defense of this tenet). Why then should we 
make this concession about “accidentality” at all? A quick 
answer could be the following: Sosa does not intend to 
commit himself with the tenet that our cognitive capacities 
in fact evolved by accident and that, as a consequence of that, 
they might be unreliable. On the contrary, the tenet that they 
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evolved by accident can be seen as a concession that he himself 
makes to a hypothetical interlocutor, in order to prove that 
even if such faculties evolved in that way, we could 
nonetheless avail of an argument of principle whose 
conclusion is that such faculties are reliable anyway.  
However, even if Sosa makes such a concession, it seems 
that something more should be said so that his interlocutor’s 
doubt can even arise, given what Sosa himself wrote, in a 
previous text, about similar doubts by Alvin Plantinga. In 
fact, it was Plantinga who presented the idea that, given a 
“blind” natural selection, the probability of our cognitive 
faculties being reliable is either low or unknowable 
(Plantinga, 1993, p. 231), in an argument that Sosa 
questioned years before Knowing Full Well. In a nutshell, 
Sosa’s point against Plantinga had been that even though it 
may indeed be rather unlikely that a certain event takes place 
by sheer chance, this unlikelihood is only relevant if we do 
not already know that the event did take place; the 
unlikelihood ceases to be relevant if, in fact, we start from 
the discovery of this surprising event and only need to 
acknowledge that the unlikely has taken place. If we 
happened to find a round stone perfectly able to roll 
downhill, argues Sosa, we might be astounded that such a 
stone had been “created” by the sheer accident of natural 
forces; however, he continues, “[w]e can plainly see […] the 
stone’s smooth roundness, and we know through much 
experience that such an object would roll reliably. The 
improbability of its having been rounded so smoothly, given 
its origin in brute forces, is then, surely, no bar to our still 
knowing it to be smoothly round”. And, if the very point of 
this argument-from-unlikelihood consists on assuming that 
the emergence of our cognitive faculties is a contingent 
natural event as any other, then that assimilation turns 
against the argument itself: “If that is a plausible response”, 
assumes Sosa, “in the case of the round stone, why are we 
 A Critical Assessment of Sosa’s  46 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 1, pp. 41-72, Jan-Mar. 2020. 
deprived of it when it comes to our own nature as reliable 
perceivers endowed with eyes and ears, etc., by means of 
which we have reliable access to the colors and shapes 
around us?” (Sosa, 2002, p. 100). 
Notably, when in Knowing Full Well Sosa presents 
something similar to an argument-from-unlikelihood, he 
does not refer to his own dissolution of the problem as it 
had appeared in Plantinga’s work. The point, however, 
remains: why is it that we are supposed not to believe that, 
concerning ourselves just as in the case of the stone, “the 
improbable has happened” (Sosa, 2002, p. 100)? The actual 
starting point of Sosa’s problem must surely be (and this is 
only to be expected, given that the last chapter of Knowing 
Full Well is called “Epistemic circularity”) that forming 
beliefs about our own cognitive faculties, unlike forming 
beliefs about round stones, involves a certain self-
referentiality: we are referring to the very faculties whose 
reliable exercise would be required in order to obtain 
acceptable evidence that they are reliable. In Sosa’s own 
phrasing of the problem (which he will immediately answer 
himself), “as soon as the implicit belief in the reliability of 
the faculty is put in question, one can hardly find support for 
that belief by appeal to the ostensible deliverances of that 
faculty. Such appeal would after all require a priori trust in 
the reliability of the faculty, and we would be in a vicious 
circle” (Sosa, 2002, p. 100). Nevertheless, as is known in the 
light of other work by Sosa, finding that a certain justification 
of our beliefs is epistemically circular is not an 
insurmountable obstacle for this author (Sosa, 1994, 1997b, 
1997a)−and, accordingly, what we will find in Knowing Full 
Well may be read as a new expression of this acceptance of 
circular arguments. As we will see, according to Sosa, when 
accepting some tenet about how the origins of our faculties 
make them in fact reliable, we can remain undisturbed by 
charges that it is circular to do so. Just as Descartes was able 
 Claudio Cormik 47 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 1, pp. 41-72, Jan-Mar. 2020. 
to argue circularly in order to arrive at his proof of a 
benevolent God that warranted his very reasoning, Sosa 
stated in his reply to Plantinga that a “naturalist” can also 
“develop a view of [her]self and [her] surroundings that 
shows [her] situation to be epistemically propitious” (Sosa, 
2002, p. 102); in the same way, as we will see in a moment, 
we can reject skeptical doubts by concluding that “our 
faculties do not have disabling origins (e.g., ones that involve 
powerful and systematic deception)” (Sosa, 2010, p. 157). 
Therefore, in a more exact formulation, what Sosa’s 
argument will attempt to show is that even if we regard the 
origins of our cognitive faculties as “blind and brute” and if 
it may be circular to argue, from the deliverances of those 
faculties, that they are reliable, it is epistemically legitimate, 
nonetheless, to insist that they are in fact reliable. 




3. SOSA’S “TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT”  
 
Before offering the argument that is the focus of this 
article, Sosa mentions in passing an alternative solution 
which requires nuancing his first description of the status of 
our cognitive capacities in a naturalistic framework (which 
presented them as the result of sheer chance). This argument 
is 
 
a kind of transcendental argument, according 
to which we could not possibly have contentful 
attitudes without a lot of built-in truth. The 
conditions required for acquiring empirical 
concepts, for example, entail that our 
application of such concepts could not be too 
far off the mark. For it is only through adequate 
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sensitivity to the presence or absence of 
perceptible properties that we acquire 
corresponding concepts of those properties 
(Sosa, 2010, p. 154). 
 
This is not, however, a strategy that Sosa is interested in 
analyzing in Knowing Full Well (as he points out, the 
possibilities of this strategy were previously assessed in Sosa, 
2009, Chapter 6). At this point, the author moves to an 
attempt to illuminate the problem of reliability by means of 
a mental experiment, which in turn is based on an analogy 
between the assessment of the cognitive capacities of the 
species and those of the individual. Sosa presents the situation 
as follows: 
 
Suppose we knew of a pill that would most 
probably disable anyone who takes it. More 
specifically, the pill induces a persistent illusion 
of coherent empirical reality. The belief that 
one did take such a pill clashes with the thought 
that one is still cognitively reliable nonetheless. 
This thought is true only if one is so lucky. But 
how could one rationally believe that one is so 
lucky, absent special reason for so believing? 
And how could one gain such a reason without 
vicious circularity? How could one do so, given 
how likely one takes it to be that one’s 
cognition is disabled? (Sosa, 2010, p. 153) 
 
The reason why a vindication of one’s own cognitive 
abilities could be circular is clear: a solution for the doubts 
concerning our own reliability could indeed consist on 
inductively supporting the conclusion “My cognitive 
capacities are functioning in a reliable way” on the basis of a 
series of premises that state that our memory and perception 
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are making us aware of real entities and events (premises 
such as “I see this table, which is really there”, and so on). 
However, the acceptability of such premises of the inductive 
inference is in turn supported by the general proposition that 
describes our knowing capacities as reliable, and it is this 
proposition which need to be able to defend since it has 
become doubtful under the hypothesis that he have taken 
Disablex, so this kind of inductive justification appears as 
unacceptable (Sosa, 2010, pp. 154–155). 
However, immediately after stating this unacceptability, 
Sosa adds a solution that appears incompatible precisely with 
the restriction presented in the previous paragraph, a 
solution that he will attempt to justify afterwards. According 
to Sosa, in effect, a premise which we can use to conclude 
that we have not taken Disablex is simply the one by means 
of which “we manifest our commitment, at least in our 
intellectual practice, to the claim that our faculties are indeed 
reliable”−a move we can make because “we are epistemically 
within our rights in affirming what we already rightfully 
commit to in practice” (Sosa, 2010, p. 155). This reference 
to an implicit “commitment” that can later be explicitly 
formulated will play a role in Sosa’s argument in its final 
version, but, obviously, what has been said up to this point 
cannot be enough, given that the insistence on the reliability 
of our capacities in spite of the possibility of having taken Disablex 
still appears as blatant question-begging. It is at this point 
that Sosa will finally present his core thesis: the circular 
vindication of our knowing capacities is acceptable simply 
because the only alternative is contradictory; in other words, 
when we are to assess the reliability of our cognitive 
capacities, there is a dilemma between either epistemic 
circularity or inconsistency. Sosa introduces this idea by 
means of analyzing what it would be like to obtain evidence that 
our capacities are indeed not reliable−in his example, 
evidence that we have in fact taken Disablex. 
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“Of course,” Sosa conceeds, “there are conceivable 
scenarios where you acquire considerable evidence that you 
have taken such a pill” (Sosa, 2010, p. 155)−and, we can 
assume, it is in light of those scenarios that the 
straightforward reiteration of the tenet that our capacities are 
reliable is manifestly insufficient. However, the key problem, 
Sosa warns us, is that  
 
Even in these scenarios you could hardly be 
unequivocally justified in believing what they 
initially suggest, that you have in fact taken the 
pill. Nor can they even fully justify you in 
suspending judgment on that question. For, the 
claim that you have taken any such pill is a self-
defeating claim. Both believing that you have 
taken it, and even suspending judgment on that 
question, are epistemically self-defeating. The 
contrary claim, that you have taken no such pill, 
follows from what is epistemically obligatory 
[…], namely your commitment to denying the 
universal unreliability of your faculties (Sosa, 
2010, pp. 155–156). 
 
Sosa defends his solution by means of a rhetorical 
question about the consequences of answering that our 
cognitive faculties are not, in the moment of that answer, 
reliable: “How then can we still coherently trust our faculties 
in sustaining that very answer?” (Sosa, 2010, p. 156). A 
similar consequence would follow from answering that we do 
not know whether our faculties are reliable: “Even here, how 
can we coherently commit to this attitude while saying that 
we can’t really tell whether, in so proceeding, we are 
proceeding cognitively aright?” (Sosa, 2010, pp. 156–157). 
On this basis, Sosa concludes that only “the confident affirmative 
can be fully coherent” (Sosa, 2010, p. 157). 
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And, in turn, that answer “that gives us reason to draw its 
deductive consequences, including (a) that we have never 
taken any disabling pill, and (b) that our faculties do not have 
disabling origins (e.g., ones that involve powerful and 
systematic deception)” (Sosa, 2010, p. 157).  
 
 
4. PRECISING THE MEANING OF SOSA’S TENETS: FOUR 
ASPECTS 
 
In spite of the confident tone of Sosa’s prose, his 
argument, centered on the alleged self-defeating 
consequences of doubting the reliability of our own 
cognitive capacities, is less clear than it should. Four points 
may benefit from a more detailed analysis: first, why exactly 
the skeptical attitude is incoherent; second, what “faculties” 
Sosa refers to in his argument; third, how exactly the second 
of the two “deductive consequences” mentioned by Sosa 
resembles the first one, and how it is supposed to function 
as a reply to skeptical doubts; fourth, how the attitude of the 
subject that reflects on her own situation relates to her actual 
cognitive state, as possibly knowable from a third-person 
perspective. 
 
4.1. The problem of incoherence  
 
As to the first of our four points, some work of clarifying 
it has been done by Ram Neta. In an article discussing a 
variety of anti-skeptical arguments available for an internalist 
view of justification, Neta includes the thought experiment 
we have just reconstructed, and makes some interesting 
remarks about it. He points out, following Sosa, that 
 
it is incoherent to hold beliefs of the form: I 
may have taken Disablex, but I don't know 
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whether my reasons for believing that I may 
have taken Disablex are trustworthy reasons.  
But can we affirm merely the first conjunct, 
without also having to affirm the second?  No.  
Given the consequences of taking Disablex, the 
second conjunct simply follows from the first 
conjunct (as asserted by me):  if it's true that I 
may have taken Disablex, then it follows that I 
cannot know whether my reasons for believing 
that I may have taken Disablex are trustworthy 
reasons (Neta, 2016). 
 
In fact, as Neta points out, the kind of inconsistency here 
is neither semantic not pragmatic: here not only the two 
conjuncts are not merely logically consistent (as in a 
Moorean paradoxical belief, of the form “p, but I don’t 
believe that p”), but the first conjunct (I may have taken 
Disablex) even implies the second (I don’t know whether my 
reasons for believing it are trustworthy) (Neta, 2016). In 
other words, what Sosa shows in his thought experiment is 
not a pragmatic paradox, but a case of epistemic self-defeat, 
which takes place when “either the truth of an argument's 
conclusion or belief in an argument's conclusion defeats 
one's justification to believe at least one of that argument's 
premises” (Silva, 2013, p. 579). 
 
4.2. The “faculties” at stake 
 
The second point in need of clarification, but which does 
not seriously affect the acceptability of the argument, refers 
to what the faculties are that Sosa refers to when he writes 
about “trust[ing] our faculties in sustaining [the skeptical] 
answer” or to “commit[ting] to [certain] attitude”. Is he 
referring to the faculties of ratiocination on which we need to 
rely when we move from certain propositions which we 
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know perceptively or mnemonically (propositions such as “I 
accepted to take part in the experiment” or “I am in a lab 
right now”) to the conclusion “I took Disablex”? Or is he 
referring, on the contrary, to perception and memory, this is, the 
very faculties that allow us to obtain those propositions on 
which we support our inference? Sosa is not explicit about 
this, but we might assume that a good reason for him not to 
clarify his point is that in both cases his answer could be 
roughly the same: if we doubt our capacity to make good 
inferences, then we will have to doubt the reasonableness of 
the very inference that we are making in order to conclude 
that we have taken Disablex; if we doubt the reliability of our 
perception or our memory, then we will have to doubt the 
very support we appeal to when we obtain the premises to 
infer that our faculties are not reliable. In either case, our 
epistemic attitude can be characterized as self-defeating. 
If we try to understand why this self-defeat takes place, 
what seems to come to the fore is the following particularity 
of the mental experiment Sosa is proposing: insofar as what 
is at stake is the reliability of our cognitive capacities as a 
whole, the empirical reality with respect to which those 
capacities would have to appear as non-reliable (the 
empirical reality to which they would not be sensitive 
enough) is the same empirical reality from which we obtained, 
by means of those capacities, the evidence according to 
which they are not reliable (for example, because we see the 
written informed consent that we have signed to participate 
in the Disablex experiment). Or, if what is in question is our 
capacity to ratiocinate, then the connection that may exist 
between different propositions, and with respect to which 
our capacity to ratiocinate is no longer functioning in a 
reliable way (i.e., we might be making bad inferences) is the 
same type of connection we need to base ourselves on in 
order to inferentially arrive at the belief that we have taken 
Disablex. If Sosa can describe as “incoherent” the attitude of 
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the skeptic, this is because the universal doubt that the skeptic 
is proposing about our cognitive capacities does not allow 
that we make an exception for some specific uses of those 
very faculties, because of which it is contradictory for the 
skeptic to consider, simultaneously, that those faculties are 
not reliable but that in one particular case−namely, when they 
provide us with information about their own 
unreliability−they are in fact reliable. The skeptic’s position 
should not admit such an exception, and, as a consequence, 
he is contradicting himself in concluding that our capacities 
are not reliable. We have, consequently, an all-or-nothing 
position: either we assume that our cognitive capacities are in 
fact disabled because of having taken Disablex, but this is a 
general conclusion that will need to refer to the data 
provided by our perception, and then there will be no 
probative value even for the elements on which we were 
supposed to reach that conclusion, or we assume that we 
actually can use those elements provided by our perception 
and memory (and which suggest that we have taken 
Disablex), but, insofar as we rely on those elements, we need 
to presuppose that we have not taken Disablex, so the 
conclusion that we have in fact taken the pill cannot be what 
we assume on the basis of those elements, as we initially 
believed. The only coherent attitude, the only attitude that 
does not lead us to contradictorily assume that our cognitive 
capacities are and are not reliable, is, then, that of assuming 
(at the level of the individual) that we have not taken Disablex 
and (at the level of the species) that our cognitive capacities 
do not have a disabling origin. 
 
4.3. The contingent character of the argument’s conclusion  
 
So far, the argument still seems to hold. However, there 
is a third, more troublesome, aspect. As to this aspect, it is 
relevant to notice what Sosa is not doing. Sosa is not saying 
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that, whatever the origins of our cognitive faculties, we can deem 
them as reliable; he is not saying, in other words, that there 
can be no genetic arguments to cast doubt on the reliability 
of those faculties. Doing so, in fact, would undermine the 
analogy he is attempting to establish between the case of 
doubting the reliability of the faculties of an individual and 
that of doubting it when it comes to the species as a whole. 
The analogy requires that, just as we have to declare, “It is 
not the case that we took Disablex; that is a contingent fact 
that might have happened but did not”, we say something 
similar about the faculties of our species. As a consequence, 
when he writes that we are entitled to the belief “Our 
faculties do not have disabling origins”, his point is not “No 
matter what the origin of our faculties is, it cannot be a 
‘disabling’ one”, but that even though our faculties might have 
had a disabling origin (i.e., even though the very idea of a 
disabling origin, according to Sosa, makes sense), it is simply 
not the case that they have had such an origin.  
The fact that, concerning the case of the individual 
reliability, the whole assessment of such a reliability depends 
on a contingent state of affairs (that of not having taken 
Disablex) is underscored by Sosa himself, by means of a 
detour around an objection. According to this objection, the 
need to presuppose the reliability of our faculties (failing 
which our position would be epistemically inconsistent) 
applies only “[i]nsofar as we are speaking of our cognitive 
faculties as a whole”. However, the objection continues, 
“why can’t we rely on one faculty (or one set of faculties) to 
question the reliability of another faculty (or another set of 
faculties)?” (Sosa, 2010, p. 14, n.). In other words, given two 
faculties, say, memory and perception, we do not need to 
presuppose that both are reliable; we might only presuppose 
the reliability of memory and, on that basis, question the way 
our perception is functioning (because things are not looking 
now as we remember them to be). So far, the core point made 
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by Sosa remains: in this example, nothing would prove that 
our memory is reliable; we would simply have to presuppose 
it. But Sosa introduces, at this point, an element of interest 
for our purposes here:  
 
Reply: Granted, but we still have a 
transcendental argument in favor of accepting 
a contingent conclusion, belief of which might 
have seemed to lie beyond the reach of a priori 
support (Sosa, 2010, p. 14, n.). 
 
On the one hand, then, the “transcendental” argument 
involves “a priori support”; on the other hand, however, its 
conclusion remains a contingent proposition−it is contingent 
whether or not we took Disablex, and whether or not our 
species is cognitively amiss. This is an important aspect to 
remark, because, even though, according to Sosa’s argument, 
we could never rationally believe the negation of this contingent 
conclusion (i.e., that we have taken Disablex, that our species 
did take a wrong evolutionary turn), it might well be the case 
that such negation is true, though the discovery of its truth 
requires an epistemic perspective which is not that of the 
first person. And this leads us to the fourth and last aspect 
in need of clarification. 
 
4.4. Point of view of the agent versus objective cognitive situation 
 
As to this fourth point, here the purpose of Sosa’s 
argument is not in need of clarification because he does not 
refer to it, but because he seems to say too much; in other 
words, because what he says does not seem to fit his general 
strategy. Let us introduce this point by means of a detour via 
a comment by Modesto Gómez Alonso: 
 
 Claudio Cormik 57 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 1, pp. 41-72, Jan-Mar. 2020. 
[W]hat Sosa points out is that, from the point of 
view of the agent, and with independence of what her 
objective cognitive situation is, belief is the only 
rational option. What is important […] is that, 
far from renouncing to her intellectual 
integrity, the agent justifies her confidence by 
preserving her rational consciousness: justified 
by reason, her confidence is not blind. […] We 
have a rational right (and a duty) to believe in 
our rationality (Gómez Alonso, 2019, pp. 46–
47. Italics ours). 
 
Now, under this interpretation, Sosa’s argument would 
refer only to what the epistemic agent must believe−i.e., 
whether or not she must believe that she has taken Disablex−, 
not to her “objective cognitive situation”−i.e., whether or 
not she has actually taken it.  
And, in fact, there would be a clear reason to assume that 
Sosa dissociates in this manner the perspective of the 
epistemic agent from her “objective cognitive situation”; 
namely, the fact that one of the results of the 
internalism/externalism debate has been to show, in Jennifer 
Lackey’s words, that “justification, when it is understood as 
the property that is necessary and, when added to true belief, 
close to sufficient for knowledge, has two general 
components”, one of which is objective and the other one 
subjective (Lackey, 2008, p. 10 Italics in the original). This is 
to say, we can ask whether a person is actually in a cognitive 
situation such that she will probably form true beliefs (and 
being in this condition is an objective affair she may not 
know about), and we can also ask whether she is reasonable 
in forming beliefs as she does (a question that requires us to 
analyze what evidence is available for her). If Sosa, as Gómez 
Alonso claims, were only speaking about the subjective 
aspect of the problem, the only difference between Sosa’s 
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approach and what Lackey describes in this passage would 
consist on the fact that, whereas Lackey considers the 
subject’s rationality as the “subjective” problem and her 
reliability as the “objective” problem, Sosa, in turn, combines 
the two questions and asks whether it would be rational for an 
agent to believe that she is reliable when she forms a belief. In 
other words, we need to distinguish three questions, not two: 
whether the agent is rational in believing that p, whether she 
is reliable in believing that p, and whether she is rational in 
believing that she is reliable in believing that p. Either way, 
the problem remains that even if she is rational in believing that 
she is reliable (i.e., that she has not taken Disablex) she might 
be wrong in this rational belief−that is, she might actually have 
taken Disablex. And, according to Gómez Alonso’s 
interpretation, as we have seen, Sosa’s argument only refers 
to what the agent is justified in believing, not to her actual 
cognitive status as a possible victim of Disablex. However, 
things get more complex when we notice that Sosa does want 
his argument not only to refer to the rationality of belief, but 
also to be “sensitive” to facts concerning the objective 




5. PROBLEMATIZING SOSA’S SOLUTION: THE 
OBJECTION OF “INSENSITIVITY TO THE FACTS” 
 
As we saw in section 3, Sosa’s argument, in its initial 
statement, is supported by the very strong claim that a 
conclusion such as “Our knowing capacities are reliable” 
cannot be defeated by contrary evidence−because any such 
evidence could only be considered as such on the basis of 
relying on those very faculties. However, Sosa tries to weaken 
the argument by saying that it does not provide us with “a 
determinative, ultima facie reason”. The outcome of this 
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concession is, as we will see, rather intriguing, because it is 
not clear how the reasons provided by the transcendental 
argument can initially work against alleged evidence that our 
capacities are not reliable, and, subsequently, be potentially 
defeated by new evidence that seems to be of the same sort 
of that evidence the argument initially invited us to exclude. 
This tension, in fact, reveals a deeper instability of Sosa’s 
position, namely, between a first-person and a third-person 
perspective in order to determine the reliability of our 
capacities. And it appears when Sosa considers the following 
objection:  
 
It seems that if there were people who have 
taken the pill, they should accept this argument 
too. But then the problem remains: If both 
people who have and people who haven’t taken 
the pill have no choice but to believe that they 
have not taken the pill, the argument that we 
have no choice but to believe that we have not 
taken the pill does not give us any reason to 
believe that we have not taken the pill (Sosa, 
2010, p. 157, footnote). 
 
We can refer to this passage as the objection of 
“insensitivity to the facts”. This objection displaces us from 
the first-person perspective which the initial statement of the 
argument invited us to consider, and inquires, instead, about 
how sensitive to the facts, as perceived from a third-person 
perspective, is Sosa’s argument, i.e., to what kinds of results the 
transcendental argument would lead different subjects, some 
of whom may have taken Disablex and some others not. 
However, when Sosa initially presented the thought 
experiment of Disablex, a few pages before introducing this 
objection, the question he posed concerned what an individual 
should rationally believe about her cognitive capacities; at that 
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point, the question was clearly one that required a first-
person perspective, thus confirming Gómez Alonso’s 
interpretation. The argument did not, at that point, concern 
the (somewhat less interesting) question of what evidences 
one epistemic agent may have to determine the possible 
radical unreliability of another epistemic agent who might 
have taken Disablex. 
And presenting the problem in relation to a first-person 
perspective, in turn, was coherent with the purpose of the 
argument being to serve as an analogy, for an assessment of 
our capacities as a species. In fact, whereas a human individual 
can have a first-person perspective on her capacities, but 
another individual can also regard them from a third-person 
perspective, in what concerns our species we do not have, in 
principle, the choice of seeing our capacities “from 
outside”2. Consequently, in the same manner in which we 
might reject a question like “How reliable are our 
capacities−but from an objective point of view, not just for us?” 
as simply a bad question, we could also expect Sosa to reject 
a question such as “How sensitive to the facts (as viewed 
from a third-person perspective) is the transcendental 
argument?” as equally misguided. 
Nevertheless, Sosa’s actual answer is more concessive 
than we might have expected. It runs as follows: 
 
But if we have no choice but to so believe [i.e., 
that we have not taken Disablex], in the sense 
that this is clearly enough our rationally 
preferable option (at least in the respect that it 
is more coherent than its alternatives), why 
then is this not a “reason” for so believing? Can 
an option be clearly our best rational option 
even when we have no reason to take it? Isn’t 
                                                          
2 More on this below, section 8. 
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the very fact that it is our best rational option a 
fine reason to take it? Not necessarily a 
determinative, ultima facie reason, but a fine reason 
nonetheless (Sosa, 2010, p. 157, footnote. Italics 
ours). 
 
Saying that the reason provided by the “transcendental 
argument” is not “determinative, ultima facie” can only mean 
that it is defeasible. Let us try to see how this can work. 
 
 
6. THE IMPOSSIBILITY TO “COMBINE” A FIRST-PERSON 
AND A THIRD-PERSON PERSPECTIVE 
  
As a matter of fact, this concessive answer is surprising 
because it implies acknowledging that the transcendental 
argument, which functions on the basis of considerations of 
coherence that have to be made by the person whose 
reliability is at stake, has to be limited in its scope (it does not 
offer “a determinative, ultima facie reason”) in the light of 
alleged possible evidence only available from a third-person 
perspective. But it is not clear how it would be feasible to 
combine these two kinds of considerations, so that prima facie 
reasons are somehow defeated by secunda facie reasons. More 
specifically, from whose perspective such a thing could be done.  
In fact, what might Sosa possibly mean when he writes that, 
from the perspective of the very subject S whose capacities 
are in question, there exists a solution which is 
simultaneously “more coherent than its alternatives” but not 
“determinative, ultima facie”? What could possibly count, 
from this perspective (not, of course, from those of other 
subjects) as ulterior evidence to tackle the question of S’s 
reliability? If I, individually, have doubts concerning my 
cognitive capacities as a whole, or if we, as a species, consider 
that our experience of the world might be entirely illusory, 
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but we are told that the most coherent epistemic attitude is 
to reject these doubts, what could count (after we have 
adopted this anti-skeptical stance) as an ulterior reason, a 
reason that could possibly defeat the “transcendental” reasons 
that initially convinced us that our cognitive capacities are in 
fact reliable? It is not clear how the kind of reason provided 
by Sosa’s argument might not be “determinative”, and this is 
because the new elements of judgment that might be added 
to that reason would only count as evidence if we presuppose 
that our cognitive capacities, on the basis of which we 
acquire those elements, are reliable. If the objection of 
“insensitivity to the facts” has to be neutralized, as Sosa 
seems to believe, by means of pointing out that the 
coherence considerations the argument appeals to do not 
need to be “determinative”, that should mean that the 
person that had trusted the “transcendental argument” but 
who actually had taken Disablex can be rationally guided from 
her error. But, how is this supposed to happen? Any new data 
that the person doubting her cognitive capacities might 
receive (data that might confirm her that she did accept to 
take part in the experiment, that she did take a pill, that she 
did not receive a placebo) would have to be rejected by that 
person, precisely on the very basis that the transcendental 
argument presents; it is not clear why these reasons would 
function in a first instance and then simply not. 
This point can also be appreciated by noting that, just as 
the thesis of our own reliability cannot be defeated by new 
empirical information, it cannot be strengthened either. Our 
doubts concerning whether or not we have taken Disablex 
cannot be dissipated by means of the cognitive psychologist 
entering the lab and declaring “Don’t worry: you were part 
of the control group; we only gave you a placebo” (just as 
radical doubts concerning the cognitive faculties of the 
species cannot be answered by the appearance of empirical 
data showing that our planet’s environment makes it 
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extremely unlikely that non-reliable cognitive mechanisms 
are reliable with the survival of a species guided by them). 
The acceptance of this kind of evidence simply presupposes 
that we have not previously disqualified it under the 
suspicion that they are precisely one more example of the 
kind of coherent illusion that we suffer. 
The impossibility of having “non-determinative” reasons 
for our own reliability, reasons whose evidential weight can 
be defeated or strengthened by new evidence as to our 
objective cognitive situation, can become even more 
apparent if we consider, instead of Sosa’s thought 
experiment of Disablex, a possibility associated to cognitively 
disabling conditions existing in the real world. Let us imagine 
a person, A., that may or may not be suffering from some 
kind of delusion that makes her radically misunderstand the 
available evidence, and who disagrees with her therapist 
about her own diagnosis−she believes that, without a shade 
of a doubt, her therapist is wrong. The therapist may try to 
convince A. that, because of her very condition, she cannot reliably 
judge her own cognitive capacities, or anything else: when 
she thinks that her therapist is wrong in treating her as 
delusional, it is only her paranoia that makes her think so; 
she should, consequently, be reasonable and accept her 
therapist’s opinion, based on the evidence available to 
her−and, given that A. is not an expert herself, this evidence 
may include elements rationally acceptable for her, such as 
“My therapist believes that I suffer from delusion” and 
“What a psychiatrist believes about their patients is usually 
right”. A. may have reasoned in this way in the past and she 
remembers it, but she thinks she has overwhelming evidence 
that, in this particular case, her therapist is wrong. The 
therapist, of course, will insist that the patient is wrong when 
assessing this evidence.  
Now, it is clear that what is required from A. cannot be 
a coherent attitude: A. is being asked to appeal to the evidence 
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available to her in order to draw the conclusion that she cannot 
reasonably evaluate the evidence available to her. Following Sosa’s 
“transcendental argument”, she will conclude that the only 
attitude that she can adopt is to assume that she is reliable 
enough. The objection of the “insensitivity to the facts” 
would enter the scene at this moment, pointing out that A.’s 
judgment might actually be rather unreliable, and that, once 
again, the transcendental argument that allows her to 
consider herself reliable is insensitive to the facts−it can also 
be used by, say, paranoid schizophrenics. But, once again, 
this does not prove that, for A. herself, the reasons provided 
to her by the “transcendental argument” are not 
“determinative”. They are in fact ultima facie reasons for 
her−it is only from the point of view of other agents that the 
question of A.’s reliability in determining whether p is 
decided by further considerations (considerations such as 
“Well, she is a schizophrenic anyway”). We may say, then, 
that A is reasonable in believing that she is reliable, but that 
A is not (meta-)reliable in believing that she is reliable: she 
believes that she is reliable because she appeals to Sosa’s 
transcendental argument, and we know that the argument is 
insensitive to the facts. Nevertheless, her lack of (meta-
)reliability may be a fact available to us, not to A. herself. 
 
 
7. A DILEMMA 
 
Now, what is the image that we can form of Sosa’s 
argument once we have considered the tension we have 
analyzed in sections 5 and 6, between a first-person and a 
third-person perspective? One possibility could be to 
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declare3 that Sosa’s argument remains too “idealistic”, 
namely, that it concedes too much to the subjective 
perspective of the knowing subject whose cognitive faculties 
are at stake, thus failing to pay enough attention to the fact 
(on which a “realist” would insist) that the subjective and the 
objective aspects of the problem do not coincide and that, as 
a consequence, the subject’s belief that her cognitive faculties 
are reliable could (although rationally justified) easily be false. 
However, Sosa’s argument, in its final version, could also be 
objected from the opposite point of view, namely, by saying 
that the argument pays too much attention to the subject’s 
objective cognitive situation, which should simply not be 
relevant if what the argument is concerned about is not the 
truth of the conclusion “My cognitive faculties are currently 
reliable” but the rationality of the subject that arrives at this 
conclusion.  
Consequently, the situation could be summarized by 
stating that Sosa faces, in the end, a dilemma: he should either 
completely give up the transcendental argument, given the 
objector’s remarks, or give up the claim that the argument 
can do justice to such remarks. What Sosa cannot do, in fact, 
is to have his cake and eat it:  
- If (first possibility) the hypothetical objection is to be 
taken seriously, then it can only mean that the 
“transcendental” argument is unacceptable, because it 
provides us with a very poor basis for accepting the 
conclusion that the subject who goes through the argument 
currently has reliable knowing capacities. In this case, the 
transcendental argument does not provide us with any 
reason, not even “prima facie”. The objection states that the 
basis provided by the “transcendental” argument could 
                                                          
3 Introducing this first possibility was the valuable suggestion made 
by an anonymous referee who reviewed the first version of this 
article. Section 7 is an attempt to do justice to this suggestion. 
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mislead us into believing something false, i.e., that the 
considerations of coherence that the argument appeals to are 
simply not good enough to exclude the possibility that our 
cognitive faculties are unreliable after all. But in this case, 
even granting the “transcendental” argument the virtue of 
providing us with a merely “prima facie” reason would be 
too much−the argument should be completely rejected.  
- If, on the contrary, the “transcendental” argument is 
considered legitimate, because it proves that even a subject 
whose capacities were actually unreliable could not rationally 
believe that they were, then the remarks by the hypothetical 
objector should be seen as misdirected: indeed, this objector 
would have missed the point of the argument, as one about 
rationality alone, and then there would be no need to weaken 
the argument as providing merely “prima facie” reasons.  
Consequently, a first conclusion of the analysis of Sosa’s 
argument is that, in order to work at all, it should be as Gómez 
Alonso thinks it is (which would fit the situation of our 
hypothetical subject A. considered in section 6); in other 
words, the argument should refer only to the subjective rationality 
of believing that one is reliable−which rationality cannot 
possibly be strengthened or weakened by new information. 
However, there is a further problem that needs to be 
developed, which refers to the very possibility of the 
individual/species analogy that Sosa proposes. 
 
 
8. THE DISANALOGY BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
THE SPECIFIC CASE 
 
We have just tried to prove that there is a flaw in Sosa’s 
attempt to weaken his transcendental argument: an 
individual who is not actually reliable cannot avail of reasons 
to defeat her belief that she is so. However, it is clear, at least, 
that we can, from a third-person perspective, find evidence 
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that the objective cognitive situation of a certain individual 
makes her unreliable. It is perfectly possible that we, as 
human beings, acquire evidence that a person (a person which 
is not ourselves) is both (“subjectively”) rational and (“objectively”) 
wrong in believing in her own reliability. Concerning the case 
of the species, however, the situation is different: not only our 
reasons to think that we are cognitively reliable are not 
defeasible; we cannot in principle ever acquire evidence that 
we were wrong in believing that we were cognitively reliable. 
Let us try to take a closer look at this problem. 
In order to do justice to the way Sosa presents his 
argument (that is, in order to do justice to Sosa’s tenet that 
the transcendental argument provides us with reasons to 
consider ourselves reliable, but which do not need to reflect 
our actual cognitive situation), we need to imagine a situation 
in which an epistemic agent (analogous to A.’s therapist, as 
we saw in section 6) says something like “Well, the members 
of the species Homo sapiens are of course rational in believing 
that they themselves are reliable, but we know they are not 
in fact reliable. And the transcendental argument they appeal 
to is insensitive to the facts, so, predictably, they are not 
(meta-)reliable in calling themselves reliable”. But when we 
try to consider this situation, an obvious disanalogy emerges 
between the individual and the specific case, thus 
undermining Sosa’s approach. Though we might well try to 
imagine seeing our species “from outside”, in a third-person 
perspective (as God, or the Martians, might possibly do), 
seeing the entire humanity as a psychiatrist could see her 
delusional patient, it does not seem that we, as human beings, 
can ever acquire evidence that would justify us in seeing our 
own species in this way. The reason is the following: if we have 
evidence that a given set of cognitive capacities, such as 
belief-forming mechanisms in rats−let us call it CCR−is 
unreliable, this requires that we can compare the beliefs that 
result from the use of the set CCR with our own, allegedly 
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more reliable, view of the world: we say that the set CCR led 
the individuals that possess it to form the beliefs p, q, and r¸ 
which we take ourselves to know to be false, and it led them 
not to form the beliefs s, t and u, which we take ourselves to 
be true and would have been beneficial for the possessors of 
CCR to have. Consequently, we need to make use of other set 
of cognitive capacities, those of normal human beings−let us 
call it CCH−, to form our own beliefs about the world, then 
compare these beliefs with those formed using CCR, and 
then conclude that CCR is an unreliable set of cognitive 
faculties. Our set of faculties, CCH, thus functions as a 
“standard meter” of what it is to believe reliably. And this 
implies that we cannot have such a third-person perspective 
on our own capacities as human beings. 
In fact, this role of normal human capacities as a 
measuring standard can be exemplified by recourse to the 
very kind of studies that has sometimes been used to argue 
that the scientific evidence casts doubt on our own reliability. 
Actually, what these studies can, at most, prove, is that, on the 
basis of what we ourselves take to know about the world, we can 
describe certain belief-forming mechanisms (different from 
ours) as non-reliable. Let us consider the famous (and rather 
barbaric) experiment by John García et al., which shows that 
rats which are given a certain kind of food, and then radiated 
enough to become sick, will tend to avoid eating this kind of 
food again (Garcia, McGowan, & Green, 1972). According 
to Stephen Stich, this study proves that “most of the beliefs 
produced by the innate inferential strategy Garcia discovered 
are false beliefs. So it is just not true that natural selection 
favors inferential strategies which generally yield true beliefs” 
(Stich, 1985, p. 124). Now, what becomes apparent in this 
study and can be summarized as a principle of “better safe 
than sorry” is, at most, that, according to what we know, 
evolution may favor a certain quantity of false positives−we 
know that the food eaten by the rats was in fact safe, and find 
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that the rats form the contrary belief nonetheless, probably 
because natural selection tends to favor being excessively 
cautious. This kind of study can only function on the basis 
of the presupposition that we, unlike the rats, actually have 
an accurate cognitive access to the world, an access on the 
basis of which we can discover the unreliability of the rats’ 
belief-forming mechanisms. Our very possibility of stating 
that rats have false beliefs requires that we rely upon our own 
access to the world as a source of true beliefs. We are taking 
ourselves as the standard meter to assess the “length” of the 
rat’s beliefs. As a consequence, we just cannot cast doubt on 
the standard itself4.  
This commits us to saying something stronger: whereas, 
in the case of the individual considered in the Disablex thought 
experiment, saying “My cognitive faculties are reliable” 
amounts to saying “The contingent fact of taking Disablex 
simply did not take place”, in the case of the species, on the 
contrary, calling ourselves “reliable” does not amount to saying 
that some contingent event has or has not taken place. Let 
                                                          
4 The point can be fully clarified if we consider, not studies about 
belief-forming mechanisms present in other species, but studies 
about the frequency of, say, bad reasoning among us human beings 
(which counts, of course, among other ways in which our cognitive 
performances can be defective). Can that kind of evidence get us 
closer to doubting our faculties, to increasing the possibility of us 
humans collectively suffering from an enduring “coherent illu-
sion”, so that a reasonable analogy with the subject of the experi-
ments with Disablex can be proposed? The answer, again, must be 
negative. Such studies may show that the right ways of reasoning 
can perhaps not be displayed spontaneously and that, as a conse-
quence, reflective thought can be necessary to correct such er-
rors−but, again, this does not show (nor would it be possible to 
show it) that the normatively right ways of reasoning are outside 
the reach of our species; on the contrary, it is those right ways that 
we are using in order to deem the other ones as faulty. 
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us return to an aspect we cursorily tackled in sub-section 4.3 
above. As we mentioned, Sosa’s transcendental argument 
does not only require us to proceed in a way that the skeptic 
could dismiss as circular reasoning−it also requires, more 
specifically, that we offer an argument that favors contingent 
conclusions, namely, “We have not taken a disabling pill”, and 
“Our cognitive capacities do not have disabling origins”. 
Now, the problem is that, whereas saying, for instance, “Our 
cognitive capacities evolved in such-and-such stages, and 
under such-and-such causal pressures” may indeed be a 
contingent, empirical proposition, something like “Our 
cognitive capacities evolved in such a way that they are reliable” 
could only be contingent if, as in the case of the reliability of 
the capacities of an individual, we could avail of some 
independent standard that functions to determine what it is to 
be a “reliable” capacity−a standard that, being independent, 
our actual cognitive faculties can fall short of. In the case of 
the individual who might have taken Disablex, it is contingent 
whether or not her capacities are reliable, because we have a 
standard of reliability that does not depend on her current 
situation−the standard of how normal, non-disabled human 
beings know the world. When it is our whole species that we 





Let us sum up the results of the previous analyses. 
 
1. Pace Gómez Alonso, Sosa’s transcendental argument 
is not only focused on the rationality of an epistemic 
agent assessing her own capacities; on the contrary, Sosa 
weakens his argument in order to consider the possibility 
that the conclusion of the argument does not correspond 
with the agent’s actual cognitive situation. 
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2. Such a weakening of the argument is not, however, 
particularly fitting for Sosa’s purposes: in fact, in order to 
refer to non-determinative reasons, Sosa needs to 
compare them to further reasons, concerning the 
epistemic agent’s objective cognitive situation, which are 
not available from her own perspective.  
 
3. Furthermore, there is another reason why Sosa’s 
transcendental argument fails: in order to provide us with 
an analogy applicable to the case of our species’ cognitive 
faculties, Sosa would need to show that we might possibly 
acquire evidence, from a third-person perspective, that 
they are in fact not reliable. But this, in turn, presupposes 
the availability of a standard, independent of the normal 
functioning of our cognitive faculties as a species, of what 
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